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Appointment of new Chief Justice
2011 saw a transition from the tenure of former Ngcobo CJ to a
new era in which the judiciary will be led by Mogoeng CJ. Both
the end of Ngcobo CJ’s term, which followed an unsuccessful
attempt to extend his term, and the appointment of the new Chief
Justice attracted significant public interest and raised critical
issues of process and substance relating to judicial appoint-
ments.
One of the central constitutional reforms was to change the
method of judicial appointments. Under apartheid, the system
was intrinsically secret and undemocratic. All that was required
was a nod from the Minister of Justice. The result was unsurpris-
ing. The vast majority of the all-white and almost exclusively male
judiciary were comfortably in tune with the prevailing political
morality, even if they were not card-carrying members of the
National Party. This was all to change with the creation of
the Judicial Service Commission (‘JSC’) The JSC was created
under the Interim Constitution and continues to exist under the
Final Constitution. Its powers are regulated by the Judicial
Service Commission Act 9 of 1994 read with the Constitution.
Politicians comprise the majority on the JSC. Of the 23 members,
fifteen represent political interests, including the Minister of
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Justice. It has been pointed out that the ANC’s dominance in
the political landscape means that ‘political representatives
on the JSC who are either ANC members of Parliament or who are
appointed by members who hold office by virtue of their member-
ship of the ANC, currently have a majority of JSC seats, albeit by
a small margin’ (Susannah Cowen Judicial Selection: What
Qualities Do We Expect in a South African Judge (2010) 13).
Since its inception, the JSC has conducted interviews of
candidates applying for judicial office. These have taken place in
public and are generally regarded as a significant improvement
on the practice of the previous regime of secret and unaccount-
able appointments. The interviews themselves, however, have
frequently been dogged by controversy, none more so than the
recent hearings which resulted in the appointment of Mogoeng
CJ. That hearing in itself was precipitated by another extremely
controversial episode — the attempt by President Zuma to
extend the office of Ngcobo CJ. Within the space of a few months,
an intense spotlight was focused on the highest judicial office. It
resulted in the demise of one Chief Justice and the rise of
another.
Fall of Chief Justice Ngcobo
Constitutional Court judges are appointed for a fixed term. The
matter is regulated, inter alia, by section 176(1) of the Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: ‘A Constitutional Court
judge holds office for a non-renewable term of twelve years, or
until he or she attains the age of 70, whichever occurs first,
except when an Act of Parliament extends the term of office of a
Constitutional Court judge.’ The matter is further regulated by the
Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 47 of
2001(‘the Judges’ Remuneration Act’) which, in broad terms,
provides that a Constitutional Court judge is normally discharged
from active service when he or she reaches the age of 70 or
completes a twelve-year term of office, whichever comes first. If,
however, at that stage the judge has not completed fifteen years
of active service, whether as a judge of the High Court or
Constitutional Court, he or she continues in active service until
completion of fifteen years or the age of 75, whichever comes
first. The Judges’ Remuneration Act, nevertheless, deals sepa-
rately with the office of Chief Justice. Section 8(a) provides: ‘A
Chief Justice who becomes eligible for discharge from active
service in terms of section 3(1)(a) or 4(1) or (2), may, at the
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request of the President, from the date on which he or she
becomes so eligible for discharge from active service, continue
to perform active service as Chief Justice of South Africa, for a
period determined by the President, which shall not extend
beyond the date on which such Chief Justice attains the age of 75
years.’
Ngcobo CJ was appointed as a judge of the Constitutional
Court on 15 August 1999. He had previously served as a judge of
the High Court. His term of office, therefore, was due to expire on
14 August 2011. He was appointed as Chief Justice on 12 Octo-
ber 2009. During the early part of 2011, rumours began to
circulate in the media that President Zuma was considering
extending Ngcobo CJ’s term of office. The Centre for Applied
Legal Studies (‘CALS’) wrote to the President and the Minister of
Justice on 17 May 2011, enquiring whether the President was
indeed contemplating extending Ngcobo CJ’s term of office, and
expressing the view that section 8 of the Judges’ Remuneration
Act was unconstitutional (see pages 93–4 of the record in the
proceedings of Justice Alliance of South Africa v President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2011 (5) SA 388
(CC)) (‘the Constitutional Court judgment’). The letter made it
clear that should the President exercise his powers under section
8 of the Judges’ Remuneration Act, there would be a challenge to
its constitutionality.
The constitutional challenge foreshadowed in CALS’ letter
seemed compelling.
Section 176(1) of the Constitution clearly contemplated the
extension of judicial office. But it was explicit in prescribing
the mechanism by which this could be done. What was required
was ‘an Act of Parliament’. The proposition that delegation of this
power was impermissible was strengthened by the very next
subsection, section 176(2), which deals with the position of
judges other than Constitutional Court judges. It provides that
such judges remain in office until discharged from active service
‘in terms of an Act of Parliament’. This formulation contemplates
delegation of the power. By contrast, the formulation in section
176(1) seemed to rule out the possibility of delegation to the
executive. Moreover, it was by no means clear that the Act of
the Parliament envisaged in section 176(1) could be applied to a
particular individual. Rather, its terms seemed to permit a generic
extension of the terms of office of all Constitutional Court judges
(and arguably all Chief Justices) but not a particular judge or
Chief Justice.
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It transpired that the speculation about the extension of
Ngcobo CJ’s tenure was well founded. In fact, on 11 April 2011,
President Zuma requested Ngcobo CJ to continue to perform
active service in terms of section 8(a) of the Judges’ Remunera-
tion Act. In his letter (reproduced in para [7] of the Constitutional
Court judgment), President Zuma drew specific attention to
section 8(a) of the Act and also stated that he took ‘cognisance of
the critical role you have, of providing leadership to the Judicial
Branch of Government’. Ngcobo CJ was requested ‘to continue
to perform active service as Chief Justice of South Africa from the
15th August until 15 August 2016’. Ngcobo CJ responded to this
letter on 2 June 2011 (quoted in para [9] of the Constitutional
Court judgment):
‘. . . I refer to the letter from the President of 11 April 2011 requesting
me to continue to perform active service as Chief Justice of South
Africa.
‘I have carefully considered the reasons for the request and the
period suggested by the President. I have decided to accede to the
request and continue to lead the Judicial branch of Government
during this critical time of the transformation of the Judiciary and
Judicial system in South Africa.
‘A number of Judicial transformative initiatives have recently been
undertaken by the Minister of Justice in Constitutional Development in
collaboration with the Chief Justice and the Judiciary. Some of the
most important programmes which require leadership over the next
five years are the following:
(i) the process of implementing Proclamation No. 44 of 2010 by the
President establishing the Office of the Chief Justice as a national
department located within the Public Service would only be
completed over the next year;
(ii) the development of a model and policy in respect of the creation
of an independent Office of the Chief Justice in line with the
independence of the Judiciary is only expected to be finalized
over the next two years;
(iii) the establishment of the Constitutional Court as the apex court in
South Africa and the constitutional recognition of the Chief Justice
as the Head of the Judiciary and head of the Constitutional Court
proposed in the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Bill and
the Superior Courts Bill, must still be piloted through Parliament
and the subsequent implementation would have to occur over the
next five years;
(iv) the Access to Justice Conference scheduled for July 2011, is
expected to yield programmes to improve access to justice
throughout the country, including the deep rural areas of South
Africa, and their implementation would require the Judiciary to
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work together with the Minister of Justice and constitutional
development over the next five years;
(v) consultation and negotiation with the Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development on the draft Judicial Code of Conduct
and the Regulations for the Register of Registerable Interests of
Judges, are currently underway;
(vi) the changes to the legislative framework for dealing with com-
plaints on judicial conduct are only in the first stages of implemen-
tation and it is expected that substantial development to improve
judicial accountability will take place over the next five years.
‘I am therefore in agreement with the President that a five year term is
appropriate and adequate to place the independence of the Judiciary,
judicial accountability and access to justice on a sound footing and
continuity in leadership is vital at this stage of these transformative
changes. . .’.
The following day, the President extended the term of office of
the Chief Justice and communicated this decision to the JSC and
to leaders of the political parties represented in the National
Assembly, before he announced his decision in an address to
Parliament (Constitutional Court Judgment para [10]).
The Chief Justice’s response to the President’s invitation is
remarkable for a number of reasons. At the level of principle, it
is surprising that the Chief Justice would have so readily acqui-
esced in the extension of his own appointment in circumstances
where he, of all people, must have been acutely conscious of the
risk that such extension would be unconstitutional. He would, in
all probability, have been aware of the letter from CALS to the
President and the Minister of Justice. Even if this letter had not
come to his attention, the matter had already attracted debate in
the media.
More importantly, however, whether or not Ngcobo CJ was
alive to the concerns raised by CALS, he could not have been
oblivious to his own judgment in Executive Council, Western
Cape v Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Develop-
ment 2000 (1) SA 661 (CC), which dealt with a similarly worded
section of the Constitution. The case concerned section 159(1) of
the Constitution which required the term of a Municipal Council to
be determined ‘by national legislation’. Section 239 of the Consti-
tution defined ‘national legislation’ to include subordinate legisla-
tion made in terms of an Act of Parliament. In the judgment of
Ngcobo J, as he then was (concurred in by all the other judges), it
was held that Parliament could not delegate its power in terms of
section 159(1) to the Minister. He stated:
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‘The Constitution uses a range of expressions when it confers legisla-
tive power upon the National Legislature in chap 7. Sometimes it
states that ‘‘national legislation must’’ and other times it states that
something will be dealt with ‘‘as determined by national legislation’
and at other times it uses the formulation ‘national legislation may’’.
Where one of the first two formulations is used, it seems to me to be a
strong indication that the legislative power may not be delegated by
the Legislature, although this will of course also depend upon context’
(para [125]).
Ngcobo J, however, articulated a point of principle. He stated:
‘Given its importance in the democratic political process, and given
the language of section 159(1), the conclusion that section 159(1)
does not permit this matter to be delegated by Parliament, but
requires the term of office to be determined by Parliament itself, is
unavoidable. In addition to the importance of this matter, I also take
cognisance of the fact that it is one which Parliament could easily have
determined itself for it is not a matter which requires the different
circumstances of each municipal council to be taken into consider-
ation. All that is required is to fix a term which will apply to all councils.
In my view, this is not a matter which the Constitution permits to be
delegated. The delegation was, therefore, impermissible. . .’ (para
[126]).
Given this judgment, it is inconceivable that Ngcobo CJ was
not alive to the risk of the extension of his appointment being
declared unconstitutional. That he took the risk was, therefore,
regrettable in itself. But perhaps more controversial was the
content of his letter of acceptance. He did not simply accept
the President’s invitation. Instead, he chose to explain why it was
such a good idea for his tenure to be extended. It was scarcely
surprising that this move was described as ‘lobbying to stay on’
(L Donnelly, I Rawoot & N Dawes ‘Why did Ngcobo pull out now?’
Mail & Guardian Online, 29 July 2011)
The threatened challenge became a reality. Four NGOs for-
mally challenged the decision — The Centre for Applied Legal
Studies, the Council for The Advancement of the SA Constitution,
The Justice Alliance of South Africa, and Freedom Under Law.
Two amici curiae were admitted — the National Association of
Democratic Lawyers and the Black Lawyers Association. Given
the urgency of the matter, the Constitutional Court convened
during recess. The matter was argued on 18 July 2011. Two days
before judgment was due to be handed down, Ngcobo CJ made
a dramatic announcement. He stated that he had withdrawn his
acceptance of the President’s invitation. In a statement issued by
the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, the
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reasons for the withdrawal were given. Ngcobo CJ had appar-
ently taken the decision ‘in order to protect the integrity of the
Office of the Chief Justice and the esteem of the Judiciary as a
whole’. He apparently ‘found it undesirable for a Chief Justice to
be a party in litigation involving the question of whether or not he
or she should continue to hold office as this detracts from the
integrity of the Office of the Chief Justice and the esteem with
which it is held’ (statement issued by the Department of Justice
and Constitutional Development, 27 July 2011).
The news of the withdrawal was met with mixed reactions.
Some commentators saw the decision as an act of selflessness.
Professor Pierre de Vos wrote that ‘. . . by resigning, Chief Justice
Ngcobo is displaying the kind of integrity and respect for his
office and for that of the Constitutional Court that those of us who
have always admired him, came to expect from him’. He went on
to argue that ‘it spares us all from the rather destructive effects
of a long drawn out fight’. (Pierre de Vos ‘Government dropped
the ball on Chief Justice’, Constitutionally Speaking (<www.
constitutionallyspeaking.co.za>), 27 July 2011).
Eusebius McKaiser, by contrast, thought it ‘surprising’ that
Ngcobo CJ was ‘receiving mostly uncritical praise for his deci-
sion’. His standpoint was that the Chief Justice had been
‘aware for months already that there is compelling doubt about
the constitutionality of the statutory clause in terms of which the
President had made him the offer to stay on’. He went on to state:
‘He should have either gently alerted the Presidency to these con-
cerns back then or declined the offer. The timing of this withdrawal is
curious. One cannot but help speculate that the embarrassing pros-
pect of one’s constitutional peers handing down a judgment that
inadvertently shows you to have acted self-interestedly, rather than
with sound constitutional sense, motivated this last minute withdrawal’
(Eusebius McKaiser ‘Sandile Ngcobo’s bombshell decision’, Politics-
web, 28 July 2011).
Regrettably, McKaiser’s view regarding the timing of the with-
drawal may be more in accordance with the facts. It has been
suggested above that Ngcobo CJ must have been well aware
that the extension of his office was constitutionally vulnerable
before the litigation commenced. A concern for the integrity of his
office and the judiciary as a whole would have compelled him to
decline acceptance of the President’s invitation at the outset. But
that was not the only opportunity that he could have seized. He
was a named respondent in the litigation. The papers were
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served upon him. Once proceedings were initiated, that too
would have been an opportunity to avoid being a (passive) party
to the litigation. (Ngcobo CJ chose to abide the decision.)
Instead, however, he waited for the matter to be argued in court
and only on the eve of judgment chose to withdraw.
Why Ngcobo CJ thought that his withdrawal would bring an
end to the litigation, presumably by avoiding the need for any
judgment, is also not clear. In the midst of the litigation, there was
a serious endeavour by the Ministry of Justice to introduce new
legislation to remedy the perceived problem with the Judges’
Remuneration Act. This development featured prominently in the
debate before the Constitutional Court even though the precise
legislative contours of the proposed remedial legislation were
unknown. Indeed, counsel for both the President and the Minister
of Justice urged the court to consider whether section 176(1) of
the Constitution permits Parliament to single out the Chief Justice
for purposes of extending an incumbent’s term of office. The
Constitutional Court judgment specifically records (para [70])
that
‘. . . both the President and the Minister asked the Court to determine
this issue in addition to the delegation point. Counsel for the President
asked the Court to do so for the guidance of the President. Counsel for
the Minister stated that it was important for the President, the Minister,
the Cabinet and Parliament that the Court determines whether this
basis of constitutional challenge is sound’.
The reason for this request flowed from the possibility of remedial
legislation that would have singled out Ngcobo CJ and permitted
his tenure of office to be extended.
Unsurprisingly, the Constitutional Court unanimously declared
section 8(a) of the Judges’ Remuneration Act to be unconstitu-
tional. It followed that the decision of the President to request
Ngcobo CJ to continue performing active service as Chief Justice
was inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid (for the order of
the court, see para [116]). Three (unnamed) members of the
court, while agreeing that section 8(a) was invalid on the basis of
the differentiation it effected, did not agree that section 176(1)
never permits differentiation on the basis of the office that the
Chief Justice holds. Put differently, these three were of the view
that Parliament could extend the term of office of the Chief
Justice, but this could only be effected through an Act of
Parliament ‘of general application which rationally pursues a
legitimate governmental purpose’ and, in particular, that such
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a measure ‘must further judicial independence’ (para [95]). Thus
the door to remedial legislation singling out Ngcobo CJ was
effectively closed.
The failure of President Zuma’s attempts to extend Ngcobo
CJ’s tenure of office necessarily meant that the office became
vacant. A Bill introduced in the midst of the furore around the
extension, which would have provided for a minimum term of
seven years after appointment as Chief Justice or President of the
Supreme Court of Appeal, has now been withdrawn. A Bill was
tabled by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development
in June 2011 to amend the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions
of Employment Act, with particular focus on the appointment of
judges, including the Chief Justice. The Bill provided for an
amendment in terms of which the Chief Justice and President of
the Supreme Court of Appeal must continue ‘to perform active
service until either completes seven years or attains the age of 75
years whichever occurs first’. The Bill was withdrawn by the
Minister on 28 February 2012 (B12–2011 GG 34444 of 7 July
2011). The Constitutional Court judgment and the announcement
that Ngcobo CJ was withdrawing his acceptance of the extension
were to presage yet another controversial event: the appointment
of Mogoeng CJ.
Rise of Chief Justice Mogoeng
The Constitutional Court judgment was followed by public
speculation as to the possible successors to Ngcobo CJ. Media
reports, citing unnamed sources, suggested that the likely candi-
dates included Moseneke DCJ, Khampepe J, Mpati P (Supreme
Court of Appeal), and others.
As it happened, President Zuma announced that he intended
to nominate Mogoeng J for appointment as Chief Justice. On
18 August 2011, Mogoeng J wrote to the JSC to accept the
nomination by President Zuma as a candidate for Chief Justice.
In his acceptance, as is required for all JSC interviews, he
disclosed his personal and professional particulars, and his most
significant contributions to the law and the pursuit of justice. He
highlighted certain judgments that he had delivered and his roles
within the judiciary in processes relating to judicial education,
case-flow management, and access to justice. This was the
beginning of a short, but dramatic, period of public comment and
the interview proceedings before the JSC.
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Public comments on Justice Mogoeng’s nomination
On 20 August 2011, the JSC passed a resolution stating that it
would issue an invitation to legal professional associations and
other institutions with an interest in its work to make written
submissions to it ‘on the suitability of the nominee by the
President for appointment as the Chief Justice’ (para 4). 21 sets
of comments were lodged with the JSC by interested parties,
predominantly civil society organizations and professional asso-
ciations.
Significant among the public responses were the comments of
Cosatu and leading legal and other non-governmental organiza-
tions, opposing Mogoeng J’s appointment as Chief Justice. The
position taken by Cosatu was significant given that the trade
union federation forms part of the tri-partite alliance, together with
the African National Congress and the South African Communist
Party, which governs South Africa. The comments opposing the
appointment generally addressed four themes: gender insensitiv-
ity, Mogoeng J’s antagonistic approach to homosexuality, con-
cerns relating to judicial ethics, and his lack of experience in
constitutional matters.
We do not recount all the submissions, but highlight two
significant submissions by Cosatu and Section 27, a leading
legal NGO.
Cosatu disagreed that Mogoeng J lacked the necessary
(minimum) experience for appointment as Chief Justice, but
expressed concerns relating to certain of his decisions on
gender-related and sexual violence, equality, and sexual orienta-
tion and his role as a State Prosecutor in the apartheid era.
Cosatu referred to five of Mogoeng J’s decisions as a High Court
judge relating to gender-related and sexual violence.
In S v Moipolai 2005 (1) SACR 580 (B), Mogoeng J reduced a
sentence of rape from ten years’ imprisonment to five years with a
further five years suspended. The case involved the ‘marital rape’
of a woman who had been in a relationship with the perpetrator.
Cosatu highlighted dicta by Mogoeng J in which he distinguished
this situation from ‘rape of one stranger by another’, doubts about
whether the boyfriend ‘could . . . have known that she was in fact
opposed to the intercourse’, and that it was ‘highly insensitive’ of
the appellant to punch the eight-month pregnant woman. Cosatu
stated that this judgment raised a number of ‘fundamental
concerns’, including,
‘General insensitivity to gender-based violence as reflected by the
reduction of the original sentence, taking into account the lack of
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rational factors justifying the need to do so[;] trivialization of the
offence of rape and the understanding of what constitutes consent,
regardless of the nature of the current or previous relationship[;]
distinct lack of awareness of criminal law on rape, including the
offence of marital rape[; and] illogical and contradictory weighing of
the factual assessment as to whether there was in fact consent, which
seems to suggest that the judge was predisposed towards finding
reasons to reduce the sentence’ (para 3.1.1).
The second case mentioned by Cosatu was S v Mathibe
(unreported judgment, 1 March 2001). This case concerned a
review of a sentence of two years’ imprisonment for grievous
bodily harm for an accused who had tied a woman to his car
bumper and dragged her for about 50 metres. On review,
Mogoeng J reduced the sentence to a fine of R2 000. His reasons
included that the woman had ‘provoked’ her assailant and that
he had pleaded guilty, showing remorse. Cosatu commented: ‘An
appreciation of the facts underlying the decision above can only
lead to the conclusion that the judge either did not appreciate the
gravity of the offence or was merely grasping at straws to ground
a decision allowing for the reduction of the original sentence’
(para 3.1.2).
Cosatu referred further to S v Modise (unreported, 19 Novem-
ber 2007). This case concerned an appeal against a conviction
and sentence of five years for attempted rape involving a
husband and wife undergoing a divorce. Mogoeng J (Gura J
concurring) reduced the sentence on appeal to a wholly sus-
pended sentence. The judgment described the conduct of the
accused who ‘throttled and pinned down’ the woman as ‘mini-
mum force’. It further distinguished the case from rape by a
‘stranger’ and referred to the fact that the offender must have
been ‘sexually aroused’, thereby overwhelming him and probably
causing his ‘somewhat violent behaviour’.
Cosatu commented:
‘As with the previous cases commented on, the facts considered
appeared to contradict the eventual conclusion that one would have
expected the judges to have made. Again what is reflected is a
fundamental lack of appreciation of the seriousness of gender-based
violence. Further, the decision disregarded the meaning of consent,
and appears to take the problematic view that where two parties know
each other and/or were in prior relationship the right to withhold
consent is diminished’ (para 3.1.3).
Cosatu also highlighted the decision in S v Mathule (no citation
provided by Cosatu). This case was an appeal against a convic-
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tion and life sentence for rape of a seven-year-old girl. Mogoeng
J concurred with the judgment of Hendricks J in which the
sentence was reduced on appeal to eighteen years, justified on
the basis of the personal circumstances of the appellant.
Cosatu commented:
‘Firstly apart from the general seriousness with which the offence of
rape should be treated, this case reflected a serious disregard for the
rights and interests of a minor. Further, none of grounds listed above
would rationally correspond to a decision that justifies a reduction of
the sentence. Children are generally considered to be a vulnerable
group, which necessarily places profound obligations on a court in
relation to the protection of their rights and interests. This decision
shows no cognisance of that fact’ (para 3.1.4).
Cosatu also discussed S v Serekwane (unreported decision,
2005). This was an appeal against a conviction and sentence for
the attempted rape of a seven-year-old girl. In a concurring
judgment, Mogoeng J upheld the appeal against conviction and
converted the conviction to one of indecent assault, reducing the
sentence from five to three years. The basis for the conclusion lay
in the medical evidence. The judges concluded that, although
bruising was found on the complainant’s vagina, the fact that ‘she
did not feel pain whatsoever . . . militates against the magistrate’s
conclusion that the appellant’s penis caused the injury.’ The
judgment also described the injury as ‘not serious’. Cosatu
commented: ‘This judgment reflects an evolving and consistent
thread demonstrating a trivializing of the nature of sexual violence
as well as the courts’ responsibilities towards the protection of
minors’ (para 3.1.5).
Cosatu also referred to the Constitutional Court decision in Le
Roux v Dey 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC), a case in which the plaintiff had
alleged, among other things, that he had been defamed by being
portrayed as homosexual. In a section concurred in by all the
judges except Mogoeng J (para [9]), the court held that ‘[a]n
actionable injury cannot be based solely on a ground of differen-
tiation that the Constitution has ruled does not provide a basis for
offence’ (para [184]). Mogoeng J did not provide reasons in the
judgment for declining to support this proposition. Noting that it
was difficult to draw conclusions from this judgment alone,
especially since Mogoeng J had not explained his position,
Cosatu proposed that Mogoeng J should be required to explain
the matter before the JSC (Cosatu submissions, para 3.2).
Finally, Cosatu addressed Mogoeng J’s role as a State Pros-
ecutor before democracy. Cosatu noted that, in the past, a
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background as a prosecutor had disqualified other candidates
because of the ‘history of prosecution of politically motivated
cases on what was an illegitimate state’. Cosatu noted, in
particular, that Mogoeng J had acted for the Bophutatswana
Government in 1991 in opposing an application to stay an
execution in a death penalty case.
Cosatu concluded its submission as follows:
‘On the basis of our concerns we cannot support the appointment of
Justice Mogoeng for the position of Chief Justice, which we believe he
would hold for the next 10 years if successful. Moreover, while this is
not presently for the consideration of the JSC, it is disturbing that even
if NOT successful Justice Mogoeng will remain on the bench as an
ordinary Constitutional Court judge.
‘Whereas the reality is that questions as to his fitness and appropri-
ateness to serve as a judge in ANY court, let alone the Constitutional
Court, raises serious concerns as to the nature and rigour of the
original process that enabled him to ascend to the bench.
‘This highlights the need to ensure a process that will seek [to]
democratize the way judicial appointments are made.
‘Mogoeng proves the correctness of the theory that says ‘‘black is
not equal to transformation’’. Ultimately we need a new beginning with
a transformed judiciary that is sensitive, accessible and accountable,
and which has as its focus the interests of the marginalized, the
acceleration of development, justice and socio-economic justice in
particular. Mogoeng does not reflect any class bias and we do not
believe that he is capable of taking forward the objective of transform-
ing the judiciary.
‘Based on his remarks, it is evident that he reflects an insensitive,
patriarchal and backward mindset that is chauvinistically inclined
towards the stereotypical role of women. His appointment would be a
slap in the face of millions of black, and African women in particular,
who have championed the rights and interests of women, and would
constitute a reversal of the struggle for total women emancipation.
‘Accordingly we are calling on the JSC to recommend against
Justice Mogoeng’s appointment and to further call on the State
President to review and re-open the nomination process in order to
identify more suitable candidates’ (Cosatu submissions, para 5).
Section 27, a legal NGO, made a submission in its own name
and on behalf of other prominent organizations — Sonke Gender
Justice Network, the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and the
Treatment Action Campaign. The organizations expressed
the ‘firm view’ that Mogoeng J was not suitable for the position of
Chief Justice (Section 27 submissions, para 6), addressing
similar themes to Cosatu.
In the first instance, Section 27 addressed the issue of
Mogoeng J’s approach to sexual orientation, referring to the
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Constitutional Court judgment in Le Roux v Dey. Section 27 noted
that judges are constitutionally required to give reasons for their
decisions (Section 27 submissions, paras 19–21). Section 27
complained that the issue was not whether Mogoeng J was right
or wrong to dissent, but rather that the public were entitled to
know the extent of his dissent, why he dissented, and whether he
is actually able to discharge his oath of office (para 22). Section
27 argued that this is particularly so given Mogoeng J’s member-
ship of Winners Chapel South Africa, the local branch of David
Oyedopo Ministries International, which preaches that homo-
sexuality is a perversion that can be cured (para 23). Section 27
recommended that the JSC question Mogoeng J on his dissent
(para 24). Section 27 also proposed that the JSC require
Mogoeng J to make a public commitment to protect the rights of
LGBTI persons (para 25).
Secondly, Section 27 considered Mogoeng J’s approach to
gender — based violence. Section 27 referred to some of the
judgments discussed in the Cosatu submission, expressing
concern at what it considered to be a ‘trend of patriarchy in a line
of judgments of Justice Mogoeng relating to cases of gender
based violence’ (para 25). Having reviewed these judgments,
Section 27 stated that they reflected that Mogoeng J ‘reached for
arguments akin to ‘‘she asked for it’’, ‘‘she wasn’t really hurt’’, ‘‘he
was understandably sexually aroused’’, and ‘‘it wasn’t really that
bad because he was not a stranger’’ ’ (para 44). In the view of
Section 27, these arguments were not befitting a judicial officer,
let alone one who occupies a seat on the Constitutional Court
(paras 44–5). Section 27 concluded that it, and the organizations
joining its submissions, had ‘no confidence in [Justice Mogo-
eng’s] ability either to dispense justice in accordance with the
values of the Constitution or in his ability to address the complex
gender questions that arise in the judicial and in the legal
profession appropriately’ (para 51). Section 27 considered that
the judgments to which it had referred evidenced ‘a patriarchal
attitude to woman’, adding that they had no reason to believe that
Mogoeng J would not exhibit similar patriarchy in relation to
gender transformation in the judiciary, the legal profession and,
indeed, society as a whole (para 51).
Section 27 concluded its submission by stating its ‘firm view’
that ‘Justice Mogoeng is not suitable for the position of Chief
Justice of South Africa’ (para 53). In addition, Section 27 called on
the JSC to conduct an open and accountable interview and
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consultation process, including conducting a public interview of
Mogoeng J open to all media (including broadcast media), as
well as to committing to publishing the advice given to the
President on the suitability of his nominee for appointment as
Chief Justice (para 54). As we show below, the JSC responded
favourably to some, but not all, of Section 27’s suggestions
regarding the process.
Mogoeng J published a detailed, 38-page, written response to
the various comments submitted to the JSC by interested parties
(available at <www.timeslive.co.za/pdf/JusticeMogoengResponse.
pdf>, last accessed 2 May 2012).
Mogoeng J started by addressing the theme of gender sensitivity,
discussing each of the judgments that had been raised by inter-
ested parties in their comments. He asserted that sound reasons
were given for all the sentences imposed in these matters (para 15).
To the extent that he was criticized for leniency, he referred to other
cases in which he had dealt with the perpetrators of rape firmly
(ibid). He added that the reasoning employed in the criticized
judgments was similar to the reasoning adopted by other appellate
judges in different cases. He stated:
‘The sentences imposed may differ but the reasoning we all employed
is essentially the same. If the submissions based on gender sensitivity
were to be upheld, then at least all the above judges will also be unfit
for judicial office’ (para 17).
Mogoeng J then turned to address the complaints relating to
his attitude towards sexual orientation. He began by asserting
that his church’s opposition to homosexuality was similar to the
position of other Christian churches and was not one of the core
values of the church (para 22). He affirmed that he had made a
public commitment to uphold the constitutionally entrenched
rights of the gay and lesbian community (paras 23–24).
Regarding the complaint about his failure to give reasons for
his position in Le Roux v Dey, Mogoeng J noted that the
paragraphs that he declined to endorse related not only to gay
people but also to other categories of persons, including Chris-
tians (paras 26–7). He added that he had not had sufficient time
to provide proper reasons for his position and accordingly
decided not to provide reasons so as not to hold up the judgment
(para 30).
Mogoeng J then turned to address criticism of his professional
ethics. A complaint had been made that he had failed to recuse
himself when his wife appeared before him in an appeal. In this
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regard, he indicated that he had consulted with other senior
judges who had assured him that there was nothing wrong with
his wife appearing before him and that he had taken the position
that she would only appear before him in appeals (para 34). He
also noted that close family members of other judges had
appeared before those judges in various matters and provided
annexures listing the matters in which specific practitioners
appeared before their fathers (para 36). He argued that this
situation was analogous to that of his wife appearing before him
(para 37).
Mogoeng J next addressed concerns about his age and
seniority. Regarding his age (50, at the time of nomination), he
provided four examples of Chief Justices of comparable age
when appointed elsewhere in the world, including John Roberts,
who was appointed Chief Justice of the United States of America
at 50 (para 40). Regarding experience, he referred to his service
as Judge President of the North West for seven years, arguing
that he had ‘a track record for taking measures to enhance
access to justice, court efficiency and the independence of the
judiciary’ (para 46). He further referred to his work in the National
Case Flow Management Committee and the Access to Justice
Conference as demonstrating his capacity to lead the judiciary
(para 47).
In response to the complaints that he had worked as an
apartheid prosecutor, Mogoeng J explained that he came from a
poor background and when offered a bursary by the Boputhat-
swana Government in 1981, he accepted it. He explained that,
because his political standpoint was known to his superior, he
was not allocated political trials as a prosecutor (para 57). He
explained that he prosecuted persons accused of murder, rob-
bery and rapes, and that he had no regret for having done so and
was also not apologetic about the bursary (para 58). In relation to
the matter of State v Ngobeza and Another 1992 (1) SACR 610
(T), an application for a stay of execution, he explained that it was
an urgent application assigned to him by his superior (para 59). He
added that at the time, the death penalty had not yet been
abolished, and that the new Constitution did not exist (ibid). He
also related that, in 1992 or 1993, he had appeared in a radio
debate about the death penalty, arguing for its abolition (para 60).
Mogoeng J then turned to deal with some of the specific
judgments raised by other commentators. In particular, he dis-
cussed judgments in which the Supreme Court of Appeal had set
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aside his decision on appeal. He explained that, in relation to
State v De Beer [2006] SCA 78 (RSA), ‘the SCA set aside my
decision and I took it as a lesson’ (para 70). In relation to Molotlegi
and Another v Mokwalase, Mogoeng J said:
‘. . . here I got the law completely wrong. It does happen to all of us
sometimes. Besides our court system has appeal procedures pre-
cisely because it is recognized that judicial officers are human beings
and may therefore err in their decisions. It would then be for an appeal
court to correct whatever error they have made’ (para 71).
In conclusion, Mogoeng J reaffirmed his commitment to
upholding and protecting the Constitution and the human rights
entrenched in it. He argued that he is neither homophobic nor
gender insensitive when it comes to the rape of women, and
concluded:
‘I decide cases based on the facts and the Constitution and the law.
And if I am appointed as the Chief Justice, I will continue to do so, as I
have done for the past 14 years as a judicial officer’ (para 73).
Against the background of these written submissions and the
written response of Mogoeng J, the JSC convened a public
hearing.
JSC interview process
AIDS activist organization, the Treatment Action Campaign,
gathered to protest at the JSC interview venue, making a
statement that the TAC was ‘firmly of the view that he [was] not
a suitable candidate’, explaining that a study of his judgments
showed ‘patriarchy’ and leniency towards rape and women
abuse (SAPA report, ‘Aids activists protest at Mogoeng interview’,
3 September 2011.) Professor Richard Calland described the
scene of the interviews to be held in the ‘sleek modernity of Cape
Town International Conference Centre’, the venue for ‘the hottest
ticket in town’ (‘Mogoeng a test case for JSC’ Mail & Guardian
Online, 2 September 2011). He commented that ‘[r]anged
against Mogoeng [was] a formidable band of representatives of
the legal profession and the human rights community, who raise
formidable and serious issues of objection to the presidential
nominee’.
The interview proceedings were broadcast live on a national
radio station and on a pay-per-view national television channel,
with portions broadcast on national free-to-air television. The
interview proceedings ran over an unprecedented two days and
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dominated local media for several days. Many members of the
legal profession attended the proceedings, including judges
and practitioners who travelled to Cape Town for the purpose.
Following discussion about whether the JSC should consider
other possible candidates, the JSC resolved not to do so but to
begin Mogoeng J’s interview. He began by reading to the JSC,
verbatim, his written response to the submissions made by
interested parties. The members of the JSC, chaired by Deputy
Chief Justice Moseneke, took turns to ask questions. Niren Tolsi
provides the following account of the drama and its principal
actors:
‘If the JSC interview were a boxing match, then minister Jeff Radebe
would undoubtedly be Mogoeng’s sweat-dabber in the corner, towel
at the ready to dry the brow — or staunch the blood — between
rounds.
‘Radebe and the three ANC MPs on the JSC, including deputy
ministers Fatima Chohan (home affairs) and Ngoako Ramatlhodi
(correctional services) together with Advocate Dumisa Ntsebeza (one
of four presidential appointees to the JSC) were instrumental in
ensuring Mogoeng had breathing space between probing, question-
ing combinations with much softer questions and observations’ (‘JSC
bruising keeps Justice Mogoeng on the ropes’ Mail & Guardian
Online, 3 September 2011).
Some of the more striking moments of the hearing included
Mogoeng J telling the chair, Moseneke DCJ, not to be ‘sarcastic’
when pressed to explain his ‘jurisprudential position’ for dissent-
ing in Le Roux v Dey (ibid). This exchange has been reported as
follows:
‘ ‘‘If you listen, you might be able to answer’’, said Moseneke.
‘‘You don’t have to be sarcastic, sir’’, retorted Mogoeng’ (Stuart
Graham ‘Mogoeng grilling ends ahead of considerations’ Mail &
Guardian online, 4 September 2011).
Mogoeng J later admitted that he had ‘erred’ in not providing
reasons for his position (Tolsi loc cit). It was reported that
‘[Justice] Mogoeng shared many tense exchanges with Deputy
Chief Justice Moseneke, although he later apologized saying
‘‘There is not a single human being who never loses his or her
temper’’ ’ (Katharine Child ‘Mogoeng interview: did JSC fulfil its
constitutional duty?’ Mail & Guardian Online, 5 September 2011.)
Another example of such an exchange was the comment by
Moseneke DCJ, in response to a reference to Mogoeng J’s
experience of organizing a conference on access to justice, that
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‘it may be one thing to run a conference, quite another to be chief
justice’ (Tolsi loc cit).
Another striking moment was the exchange with Member of
Parliament, Koos van der Merwe, relating to Mogoeng J’s state-
ment that he had prayed and got a signal that he should accept
the nomination. The exchange between Van der Merwe and
Justice Mogoeng was reported as follows:
‘Do you think God wants you to be appointed chief justice?
— I think so.
‘That creates a problem for me. If I vote against you, what is God going
to do to me?
— That is between you and God, commissioner’ (Graham loc cit).
At the end of the JSC proceedings, Mogoeng J gave a media
statement that, if appointed, he would ‘ensure that no judicial
officer would suffer the way [he] did’ in the days between his
nomination and his two-day interview, referring to the ‘intensity of
pressure and comments made about [him]’ in the media (Niren
Tolsi ‘JSC accepts nomination of Mogoeng’ Mail & Guardian
Online, 4 September 2011.) He also assured women, as well as
the gay and lesbian community, that their rights would be
protected and that he hoped to unite the judiciary by making it ‘a
priority to reach out’ to members of the Constitutional Court and
other courts, including those critical of his nomination (ibid).
Following the interview proceedings, the JSC met behind
closed doors to deliberate and vote. The majority of the JSC
voted to support President Zuma’s nomination of Mogoeng J
(ibid). Tolsi reports that JSC spokesperson, Dumisa Ntsebeza,
made a statement that, for the first time, the full transcript of the
JSC deliberations would be furnished to the President in light of
concerns raised about the suitability of Mogoeng J for the
position.
Several commentators criticized the decision of the JSC on the
basis that it had failed to discharge its constitutional duty. As to
the substance of the decision, the JSC was criticized for merely
asking whether Mogoeng J fulfilled the formal requirements for
appointment, and not whether he was an ‘exceptional’ candidate,
or considering his nomination in light of other possible nominees
(Child loc cit). Section 174 of the Constitution provides that the
President may appoint the Chief Justice after consulting the JSC
and heads of the opposition parties represented in the National
Assembly. The leader of the Democratic Alliance also com-
plained that the President had not adequately consulted her, after
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the President cancelled a meeting scheduled to discuss the
issue (ibid).
In our view, a purposive interpretation of section 174 of the
Constitution does require the JSC, when consulted by the Presi-
dent, to advise the President on the merits of potential appointees
beyond simply confirming that a nominee meets the formal
requirements for appointment. COSATU in its submissions con-
ceded that Mogoeng J met the ‘minimum requirements for
appointment’ in terms of section 174 of the Constitution, but
argued that the focus should rather be on the character and
mindset of the nominee, in particular the extent to which these are
consistent with the Constitution (COSATU submission on the
nomination of Justice Mogoeng for the post of Chief Justice,
3 September 2011, para 2). The function of minimum threshold
vetting could be met without involving the JSC at all. During the
interview, Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Jeff
Radebe, surprisingly referred to the ‘minimum’ requirements for
appointment of a Chief Justice in terms of the Constitution, stating
that Mogoeng J met these requirements and implying that this
was the end of the JSC’s enquiry (Pierre De Vos ‘Interview with
Justice Mogoeng — live blog’, Constitutionally Speaking, 3 Sep-
tember 2011, last accessed on 26 March 2012). It would be
startling, however, if the President were to assert that he did not
wish to appoint an excellent (if not the ‘best’) candidate but would
be satisfied with appointing someone with the formal qualifica-
tions for appointment as Chief Justice. It is difficult to assess
whether Mogoeng CJ would have met the appropriate constitu-
tional standard, as the entire JSC proceedings were not directed
to this question.
More debatable is whether it is appropriate for the JSC to
propose other possible candidates to the President. However,
comparison among candidates may be necessarily implied in
any substantive assessment of the President’s nominee for
appointment.
Benefits and lessons of the JSC process
In a media briefing to announce his decision to appoint
Mogoeng J to the position of Chief Justice, President Zuma said
that the manner in which the candidate had responded to what he
called the ‘spirited public commentary on his candidature’ had
protected the integrity of the Constitutional Court and the judi-
ciary (Charles Molele ‘Zuma applauds ‘‘dignified’’ Mogoeng’ Mail
& Guardian, 9 September 2011). President Zuma commented:
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‘Chief Justice, you maintain[ed] a dignified silence and only
responded to the criticism at the correct forum, the JSC. The judiciary
should not be part of mud-slinging and other spats that happen from
time to time in society’ (ibid).
Speaking at the same press conference, Mogoeng CJ
described the process surrounding his nomination and interview
as ‘a tsunami of a special kind’ (ibid).
While Mogoeng CJ undoubtedly experienced the JSC process
and ‘spirited’ public commentary as unpleasant, in our view the
transparency and openness of the JSC interview process and
the increased public participation are to be strongly welcomed. It
is indeed deeply unfortunate that the concerns about his suitabil-
ity that were voiced in the process, most of which pre-dated his
2009 JSC interview and appointment to the Constitutional Court
as an ordinary justice, were not raised earlier.
Following the appointment of Mogoeng CJ, there has been
heightened interest and participation in the judicial appointment
process generally, in particular among the legal professional
bodies. The General Council of the Bar and the constituent Bars
have taken steps to ensure that all applicants for judicial appoint-
ment are now reviewed and comments are furnished to the JSC.
Civil society organizations have also increased their participation
in the process.
There is also heightened scrutiny over the JSC itself, but
commentators continue to express concerns at its institutional
‘capture’ and loss of independence. Tolsi’s prediction of the
voting of the JSC on Mogoeng J reflects a deeply troubling
general understanding of the independence of members of the
JSC: ‘The JSC, whose 23 members will vote by secret ballot on
whether to endorse the president’s nomination of Mogoeng, are
likely to find in his favour with the body having enough Zuma
appointees (four) and ANC members (three MPs, four National
Council of Provinces members and Radebe) to have a 12–11
majority’ (Tolsi loc cit).
In the JSC as constituted in the past, there was never any
suggestion that the members appointed by the President, who
included George Bizos SC and Kgomotso Moroka SC, were
bound, or even expected, to endorse candidates preferred by
the President. Worryingly, commentators now suggest that the
four presidential appointees are partisan and that the members of
the JSC no longer exercise independent judgment, but operate
as a caucus on instructions of the ruling party, as we discuss
below.
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However, we reiterate that the greater openness and transpar-
ency of the JSC proceedings is to be strongly welcomed, and
may in future serve to enable the public (including civil society
and the legal profession) to influence the approach of the JSC to
questions such as the threshold for ‘suitability’ and the degree of
independence required of JSC members in future.
Conclusion: presiding under scrutiny
Mogoeng CJ stands to serve a term of a decade at the head of
the judiciary, a significantly longer term than his two immediate
predecessors. This period will, in all likelihood, be a significant
one in shaping South Africa’s nascent constitutional jurispru-
dence and influencing the institutional culture of the Constitu-
tional Court. Under Mogoeng CJ, the Constitutional Court has
moved towards an approach to oral hearings that seeks to follow
the practice of the United States Supreme Court. The Chief
Justice has explained to counsel appearing in the Court that the
Court wishes oral argument to be brief, limited to highlighting
the central issues and responding to questions from the Court.
Hearings are now usually completed by lunchtime, even where
four or five sets of counsel appear. In the earlier days of the Court,
hearings would typically last for the full day. Unlike his predeces-
sors, Mogoeng CJ faces the challenge of considerable media
and professional scrutiny over his conduct as Chief Justice and
the substance of his decision-making, as a result of the events
described above.
Already, there has been one fresh incident resulting in com-
mentators raising questions about the Chief Justice. Reports
emerged that the Chief Justice had sent an e-mail requesting
senior judges to attend a leadership conference to be conducted
by a well-known American evangelical speaker. It was reported
that an e-mail was sent on behalf of Mogoeng CJ by Memme
Sejosengwe, Chief Director of Court Performance, in which heads
of court, judges president, their deputies, and ‘the most senior
judge in the division where there are no deputy judges president’
were ‘requested to be available’ for an evangelical leadership
conference to be held in Johannesburg in early March 2012. The
‘I Can John Maxwell Conference’ was hosted by John C Maxwell,
an American evangelist and motivational speaker, as the main
speaker. The event was hosted at Hope Restoration Ministries, a
Christian church.
The request sparked controversy in the media, with anony-
mous judges and members of the legal profession reportedly
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complaining (anonymously) that the Chief Justice had acted
inappropriately in appearing to instruct colleagues to attend a
conference with specific Christian content hosted at a church.
The Mail & Guardian quoted several senior judges, speaking
on condition of anonymity, as reacting with ‘astonishment’ and
‘deep concern’ to the request and complaining that it showed
‘religious insensitivity’ and ‘blurring of church and state’
(Niren Tolsi ‘Mogoeng’s evangelical gaffe’ Mail & Guardian,
16–22 March 2012). The heads of court responded to the media
storm by issuing a statement in support of Mogoeng CJ, in which
they said that ‘[t]he invitation was not to a religious event but to a
leadership conference, which nobody was ordered or compelled
to attend’ (SAPA article, ‘Heads of court support Mogoeng’ News
24, 18 March 2012).
Prominent journalist, Mondli Makhanya, reacted strongly to this
incident, using the issue to rehash the JSC proceedings leading
to Mogoeng CJ’s appointment (‘The JSC must answer a charge
of moral cowardice’, Sunday Times, 18 March 2012.) Makhanya
asserted that the Chief Justice’s request relating to the confer-
ence has proved right those who questioned his suitability for
appointment. He accused the JSC of ‘moral cowardice’ in sup-
porting the appointment, which he described as ‘the worst
decision in the JSC’s 15 years of existence’. Makhanya provides
the following analysis of what he calls the ‘capture’ of the JSC:
‘While the institution started off as a collection of the strongest minds
from the legal, political and academic worlds, today it is hard to vouch
for its collective wisdom and integrity.
‘Not that they are intellectually lacking. Rather it is that many of them
lack moral steel. Instead of doing what is right and selecting the best
candidates, they follow a Luthuli House brief. The philosophy of many
on the commission seems to be: ‘‘Ask not what is good for the country,
but what the party mandarins want’’.’
Makhanya gloomily predicts that this philosophy is likely to
prevail with future appointments and that
‘. . . the Constitutional Court has already been identified as the next
target for capture. And the already captured JSC will be the instrument
with which this capture is carried out.’
Makhanya warns that South Africans should brace themselves
for ‘more Justice Mogoengs’, adding that he considers that it will
be ‘hard for anyone to match the wackiness of our current chief
justice’ (ibid ).
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All of this makes for a fraught and tension-filled atmosphere
within which Mogoeng CJ must perform his function as Chief
Justice. At the time of the appointment, some civil society
organizations indicated that they were considering a legal chal-
lenge to the appointment. For instance, gender rights organiza-
tion, Sonke Gender Justice, issued a statement that they were
considering a legal challenge to the appointment of Chief Justice
Mogoeng (Child loc cit). The consensus that appeared to emerge
in civil society was that such a challenge would be unlikely to
succeed and would, whatever the result, do damage to the
administration of justice.
Arguably, rehashing the JSC proceedings and the debate around
the appointment today also threatens to destabilize the judiciary.
However, the media has already shown that the appointment
debate remains fresh in the memory and that the concerns about
his suitability are likely to be repeated whenever the Chief Justice
attracts any fresh controversy. This leaves the Chief Justice operat-
ing under close and constant public scrutiny, not only in his
judgments, but whenever he acts as head of the judiciary, espe-
cially where matters of religion, sexuality and gender arise.
As Chief Justice, he will also now chair the proceedings of the
JSC. It is to be hoped that the gains in terms of transparency and
openness will not be sacrificed on the back of Mogoeng CJ’s
criticism of the process following his nomination. Crucial ques-
tions relating to the proper role of the JSC and its members and
the constitutional standards by which to judge candidates for
appointment to the judiciary are likely to continue to arise during
the tenure of Mogoeng CJ.
Continuing review of JSC
For the past several years, news media and the law reports, as
well as this section of the Annual Survey, have been dominated
by coverage and analysis of the ‘Hlophe saga’, in its various
manifestations. 2011 was no exception, with two high-profile legal
challenges being resolved on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Appeal. In both of these matters, the Judicial Service Commis-
sion (JSC) and Hlophe JP failed to persuade the court of appeal
of the lawfulness of their actions. In the light of the notoriety of the
factual background, it is not necessary to rehearse the story in
detail. It suffices to recall that both legal disputes arose directly
out of the decision reached by the JSC in August 2009 that it
would not proceed with its inquiry into the alleged impropriety of
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Hlophe JP’s conduct in approaching two members of the Consti-
tutional Court in early 2008, and in initiating discussions with them
about then-pending matters involving Jacob Zuma, elected as
President of South Africa a year later. These approaches led
directly to the laying of a complaint of gross misconduct with
the JSC by all the judges of the Constitutional Court against
Hlophe JP, and a counter-complaint by Hlophe JP of widespread
breach of his rights caused by the publication of this complaint
without giving him a hearing.
The appeals under consideration in 2011 were heard within
three days of each other in mid-March, and judgment was
delivered in each case by a separate bench of the Supreme
Court of Appeal, on the last day of the month. The appeal which
was argued first arose from the decision of a full bench of the
Cape High Court (in Premier, Western Cape v Acting Chair-
person, Judicial Services Commission 2010 (5) SA 634 (WCC)),
and turned on three issues: the necessity for the premier of a
province to be present when the JSC considers ‘matters relating
to a specific High Court’ (s 178(1)(k) of the Constitution); the
lawfulness of the composition of the JSC when taking decisions
not concerning the appointment of a judge; and the necessity of
complying with the requirements of section 178(6) of the Consti-
tution, which prescribes that any decision of the JSC must be
supported by a majority of its members. On all of these issues,
the court a quo had found for the applicant premier, with the
result that the JSC and Hlophe JP appealed against these
decisions.
In Acting Chairperson, Judicial Service Commission and
Others v Premier of the Western Cape Province 2011 (3) SA 538
(SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in
fairly summary fashion (per Cloete JA; Harms DP, Lewis JA,
Ponnan JA and Majiedt JA concurring). After a brief review of the
facts and issues (paras [1]–[5]), the court turned to the proper
interpretation of section 178(1)(k) of the Constitution, key to the
resolution of the first two issues on appeal. After noting that it was
common cause that the premier was entitled to be present (as
was the Judge President of a high court) when a judge was to be
appointed to a high court within their province (para [6]), Cloete
JA turned his attention to whether the same approach should be
taken where decisions about a judge’s fitness or propriety to
continue in office (as contemplated in s 178(5) of the Constitu-
tion) were to be taken. In the face of arguments from the
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appellants that Hlophe JP’s alleged misconduct bore no relation-
ship to his membership of any particular high court, the SCA
concluded that Hlophe JP’s fitness to stay in office was ‘. . . so
plainly a matter relating to the specific high court concerned that
no further discussion is necessary. . .’ (para [10]). In response to
arguments of the JSC about what would be the case when the
possible removal of judges who served in other courts (such as
the Supreme Court of Appeal, or the Constitutional Court) was
before the JSC, the court pointed out simply that these were not
‘high courts’, and so section 178(1)(k) did not apply; and, further,
that it was ‘inconsistent and illogical’ for a premier to be involved
at the appointment stage, but not when removal of a judge was
being considered (paras [11] and [12]).
After dealing with several arguments by the appellants based
on linguistic points, the Supreme Court of Appeal squarely faced
the contentions based on the separation of powers, essentially
that it was inappropriate under the Constitution to involve mem-
bers of the executive in such delicate decisions as the determina-
tion of misconduct of a judge. Cloete JA was of the view that such
an argument flew in the face of the deliberate construction of the
JSC under section 178, which ensured that each branch of
government, as well as all the elements of the legal profession,
was appropriately represented in its ranks. When it came to
questions of judicial misconduct, the process was in two stages,
the first involving the JSC, and the second requiring a two-thirds
majority of the National Assembly, which made it logical that the
ten members of the JSC drawn from Parliament should not be
involved in the first stage (paras [14]–[18]). Thus the court
concluded that the Premier should have been included as a
member of the JSC when it took its decisions of August 2009; the
failure to invite her to be present rendered the decisions unlawful.
The court took an even more dismissive attitude to the appel-
lants’ arguments about the majority required for the JSC to make
a decision. While section 178(6) of the Constitution required a
majority of its members (thirteen in this case) to take any
decision, the Premier had alleged that only ten members had
been present, and that the decisions had been taken by a vote of
10–6. In response, the JSC refused on ‘policy grounds’ to
disclose the vote count, which drew strong censure from the
court, as follows (para [19]):
‘An evasive answer like this by senior counsel [the deponent] on
behalf of a body like the JSC cannot be countenanced. It is the
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number of members who voted either way, not their identities, that is
relevant. . . . Nor is this attitude reconcilable with our constitutional
democracy which values openness and transparency.’
Thus the court dismissed the arguments by the appellants that
all that was required by section 178(6) was a majority of those
present and voting: the Constitution stipulated clearly to the
contrary (para [20]). On the issue of whether the absence of one
of the advocates who should have been present on the day was
fatal to the work of the JSC, the court preferred not to decide the
matter, as there was insufficient clarity on the reasons for his
absence.
As to the remedy, and in response to arguments from the
appellants that the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of
2000 (‘PAJA’) and the Constitution (s 172(1)(b)) gave the court a
discretion to choose a ‘just and equitable’ award, the Supreme
Court of Appeal expressly ruled out any reliance on the PAJA: the
matters before it were governed directly by the Constitution, and
did not raise procedural matters which could be regarded as
‘administrative action’ as defined in section 1 of the PAJA.
However, in the face of several arguments from the JSC and
Hlophe that the matter should be left undisturbed despite the
irregularities, Cloete JA again made the court’s univocal view
clear (para [25]):
‘I pause to remark that it would indeed be a sorry day for our
constitutional democracy were serious allegations of judicial miscon-
duct to be swept under the carpet for reasons of pragmatism and
practicality. . . . The public interest demands that the allegations be
properly investigated, irrespective of the wishes of those involved.’
As a result, the order of the court a quo was confirmed, setting
aside the decisions of the JSC in August 2009, so as to enable it
to perform its constitutional obligations (para [25]).
This strong rebuff to the attempts by the JSC and Hlophe JP
to explain (and essentially to excuse) the JSC’s procedural
lapses in this set of decisions was reinforced as regards the
substantive justification for it in the second appeal handed down
on 31 March 2011. In Freedom under Law v Acting Chairperson:
Judicial Service Commission and Others 2011 (3) SA 549
(SCA), a different bench of the same court (per Streicher JA;
Brand, Cachalia, Theron and Seriti JJA concurring) granted
leave to appeal the decision of Mabuse J in the North Gauteng
High Court, delivered just over three months previously, and
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overruled it, as well as dismissing a conditional counter-appeal
by Hlophe JP.
The judgment on appeal starts by setting out a very useful
summary of the dispute between the judges of the Constitutional
Court and Hlophe JP, from its beginnings in late May 2008, and
the law and regulations pertaining to it (see paras [1]–[15]).
The first hurdle to be overcome by the appellant was to justify
its standing to pursue the matter, which had been raised in the
court a quo, and was argued again by Hlophe JP in his
conditional counter-appeal. Freedom Under Law (FUL) is a
non-governmental organization which seeks to advance the rule
of law and the independence of the judiciary under the Constitu-
tion, and it argued that it accordingly had standing not only in its
own interest, but also in the public interest and in the interest of all
litigants who come before the courts over which the respondent
judges may preside (para [16]). The Supreme Court of Appeal
noted that the Constitutional Court had from its inception stressed
that a broad approach to standing be adopted in matters of
constitutional compliance (paras [19] and [20]), and concluded
that —
‘[t]here is no reason to doubt the applicant’s statement . . . that it is
acting in the public interest. Every South African citizen has an interest
to be served by judges who are fit for judicial office and by courts
which are independent and impartial. . . . It is therefore in the interest
of every . . . citizen that the JSC should properly and lawfully deal with
every complaint of gross misconduct. . . .’ (para [21]).
In addition, the court was of the view that ‘[i]t is for bodies like
the applicant that can afford to [call the JSC to account] and
whose very mission is to secure and strengthen the indepen-
dence of the bench to take action’ (para [22]), and so it upheld
the stance taken by Mabuse J.
As to the substance of the matter, the essence of appellant’s
arguments was that the JSC’s decisions of August 2009 were in
breach not only of section 165(4) of the Constitution but also
amounted to unlawful administrative action in breach of section
33 of the Constitution (the rights to administrative justice). FUL
argued that when the JSC had decided in July 2009 to initiate an
enquiry, it had done so without appreciating that such action had
already been taken by it, a year before, and that its decision was
thus tainted by mistake of fact, and unlawful as a consequence. It
is important to note that the membership of the JSC had during
this period altered to some degree, consequent particularly on
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the replacement of the four presidential nominees to the JSC after
the election to office of President Zuma in June 2009. While
the court below had found in favour of the JSC on this issue, the
Supreme Court of Appeal decided that it was unnecessary to do
so, as the later decision of the JSC could only have been
explained on the basis that the matter between the Constitutional
Court judges and Hlophe JP should be reconsidered, given its
changed membership and other factors (para [28]). As a result,
FUL’s argument about the existence of a mistake of law could not
prevail (para [29]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal then proceeded to look closely
at the justifiability of the decisions taken by the JSC in the course
of July and August 2009. It rehearsed the various views
advanced by those judges (Langa CJ, Moseneke DCJ, Nkabinde
J, Jafta AJ and Hlophe JP) who had appeared before the
sub-committee of the JSC (see paras [31]–[40]), which clearly
indicated that there was a series of untested contradictions (set
out in para [42]) between the evidence of Nkabinde and Jafta JJ,
on the one hand, and Hlophe JP, on the other. The JSC’s failure to
find that these contradictions related materially to the question of
Hlophe JP’s fitness to hold office was found by the Supreme
Court of Appeal to be irrational (para [42]). Furthermore, the
standard of proof employed by the JSC (beyond reasonable
doubt, as in criminal proceedings) was found by Streicher JA to
be inappropriate to an enquiry into judicial misconduct, which
was likened more to a disciplinary enquiry, in which proof on a
balance of probabilities was generally required (paras [45] and
[46]). The court examined the five attempts at justification for its
decisions by the JSC, reasoning which the appeal court found
‘surprising’ (paras [47] and [48]). Especially in the light of the
JSC’s constitutional duty to ‘investigate allegations of misconduct
that may threaten the independence, impartiality, dignity, acces-
sibility and effectiveness of the courts’ (para [49]), its dismissal of
the complaint of the Constitutional Court judges was an ‘abdica-
tion of its constitutional duty’, and thus unlawful. Unlike in the
previous case discussed above, the Supreme Court of Appeal
found here that the conduct of the JSC satisfied the definition of
‘administrative action’ in the PAJA, and was thus ‘reviewable in
terms of section 6(2)(h) of [the] PAJA for being unreasonable in
that there was no reasonable basis for it’ (para [50]).
One further issue merited the attention of the Supreme Court
of Appeal here, being Hlophe’s countercomplaint against the
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Constitutional Court judges. Although FUL had also argued in its
papers for the setting aside by the Supreme Court of Apeal of the
JSC decision to dismiss the counter complaint, the court pointed
out that (para [55])
‘. . . there was no evidence contradicting the evidence of the Constitu-
tional Court justices on the basis of which the allegations [by Hlophe]
against them could be established. The JSC was therefore entitled to
dismiss the counter-complaint on the basis that the allegations were
incapable of establishment.’
As to remedy, the respondents once again (as they had in the
Premier case above) endeavoured to persuade the court to
exercise its discretion to make a ‘just and equitable’ award (both
in terms of s 172(1) of the Constitution and s 8 of the PAJA), and
to let the decisions stand, citing delay and cost considerations.
The court would have none of this: not only did the constitutional
inconsistency of the JSC’s decisions oblige the Supreme Court of
Appeal to declare them invalid (para [61]), but ‘[i]t cannot be in
the interests of the judiciary, the legal system, the country or the
public to sweep the allegations under the carpet because it is
being denied by the accused judge, or because an investigation
will be expensive, or because the matter has continued for a long
time’ (para [63]).
In the formal words used in the order of the court, after granting
leave to appeal to FUL but denying Hlophe leave to cross-appeal,
‘the decision of the JSC . . . ‘‘that the evidence in respect of the
complaint does not justify a finding that Hlophe JP is guilty of
gross misconduct’’ and that the matter accordingly be ‘‘treated as
finalized’’, is reviewed and set aside’, with costs (para [65]).
(Discussion of this judgment should not be closed without a bow
in the direction of legal history: the amicus brief filed by Professor
Kader Asmal, a former Cabinet Minister and leading proponent of
constitutionalism, on his own account, while appreciated by the
Supreme Court of Appeal, was not favoured with a costs order,
given the fact that all parties were ‘well represented’ (para [64]).
Professor Asmal died within three months of this judgment,
vindicated in his arguments, but saddened by the decline in the
level of constitutional governance exemplified in this saga.)
So, what can be said by way of temporary conclusion on this
long-running, festering wound on the judicial body politic in South
Africa? The main point perhaps to be made is to note the
appalling track record of the JSC in the frenzied rounds of
litigation fought out over the past few years, at enormous cost to
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all concerned, not least the taxpayer. Time and again, almost
without exception, the JSC has been found wanting in terms of its
proper compliance with its constitutional and statutory obliga-
tions, let alone its public image as one of the bastions of the
effective safeguarding of the independence and impartiality of
the judicial arm of government. One needs ask whether the
composition of the JSC, or more accurately the manner in which
its members have been appointed, has not been usurped for
sectional purposes, which in turn has led it to take decisions for
unlawful reasons.
By contrast, the response of the courts has been to remain
generally true to the constitutional project. In the two decisions
discussed at length above, there is striking affirmation of the
values of the Constitution (s 1) as well as the specific require-
ments laid down for the role, composition and functioning of
the JSC. For an administrative lawyer, the passing references
to the applicability of the PAJA to the conduct of the JSC,
especially given the express reference to it in section 1(gg) under
the definition of ‘administrative action’, are of interest, although
most would agree that the Supreme Court of Appeal ‘got it right’
on both scores in these cases.
On 30 March 2012, the Constitutional Court unanimously
refused leave to appeal against both these decisions. The
Constitutional Court judgment will be reviewed in the 2012 Annual
Survey, but its effect was to ensure that the Supreme Court of
Appeal has had the final say on these matters (Hlophe v Premier
of the Western Cape Province, Hlophe v Freedom Under Law
[2012] ZACC 4). In law, the JSC is once more seized of the
matter, despite its apparent reluctance. Meanwhile, the clock
runs, almost four years after the original complaint by the judges
of the Constitutional Court.
LEGAL PROFESSION
Given the travails of judicial officers in regard to their ethical
and professional conduct over the past few years, as detailed
above and in this part of the Annual Survey in prior years, and
given the pervasive concern in government about growing levels
of corruption in society, it is small wonder that the bodies whose
task it is to govern the legal profession have had their work cut out
for them. In the year under review, three reported cases involving
the attorneys profession are worthy of note.
31THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
In Law Society of the Northern Provinces and Another v Viljoen;
Law Society of the Northern Provinces and Another v Dykes and
Others 2011 (2) SA 327 (SCA), the Council of the appellant
governing body of the attorneys’ profession had adopted a
resolution (in June 2009) to the effect that, where it had resolved
to apply for the suspension or removal of an attorney from the roll,
a ‘fidelity fund certificate’ should not be issued to such a member,
unless the Council decided otherwise for good reason. The
applicable legislation (s 42 (3)(a) of the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979)
provided that, if the secretary of the Law Society to whom
application for such a certificate was made was ‘satisfied that
the applicant has discharged all his liabilities to the society in
respect of his contribution and that he has complied with any
lawful requirement of the society’ he should forthwith issue such a
certificate. Effectively, therefore, the Council resolution, which
was not publicized to the attorney-members of the Society,
introduced a new criterion for the issuing of a certificate.
Respondents in these two appeals, decided together as
the issues were the same, were attorneys in respect of whom the
Society had received many complaints from the public as to their
conduct, such that the Society had instituted proceedings in the
High Court to strike their names from the roll, but pending
resolution of these proceedings they remained on the roll. The
Society reminded them to apply for a certificate, but then
promptly refused to issue it, which meant that they were unable to
practise.
The respondents sought to review the lawfulness of the resolu-
tion on two grounds: that it was so vague as to be of no force
or effect; and that the apparent additional requirement for
the granting of a certificate imposed by the Council through the
resolution was not consonant with the legislative scheme of
the Act (para [12]). Bosielo JA (Heher JA, Shongwe JA, R Pillay
AJA and K Pillay AJA concurring) accepted both these argu-
ments, dismissing the appellant’s attempts to breathe life into the
resolution by pointing out that the respondents could have made
representations to the Council to avoid its sanctions (paras
[17]–[19]). In dismissing the appeal, the court also awarded
costs against the appellant, despite the fact that the Society
argued that it enjoyed a special status as a litigant, as it was not
pursuing its own interests in such litigation (paras [20]–[22]).
Thus we see the judiciary insisting on fair process, despite the
laudable objective being pursued by the regulatory authority. In
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similar vein, but with a different outcome, a full bench of the Free
State High Court was asked by the provincial law society to
prevent two attorneys who had been struck off the professional
roll from continuing effectively to practise as attorneys but as
members of a close corporation. In Law Society, Free State v
Macheka and Another 2011(5) SA 591 (FB), Lekale AJ (Ebrahim J
concurring) was asked by the applicant to interdict the respon-
dents from continuing to practise as attorneys, to hold them-
selves as attorneys, or to provide legal services for financial
reward, having continued to operate, but in the form of a different
business enterprise, from the same premises as they had before
being struck off the roll. The respondents denied that they were
acting in contravention of the striking-off order, and also relied on
their right (s 22 of the Constitution) to freedom of trade, occupa-
tion and profession.
Having considered the relevant statutory framework and the
applicable case law, the court found that, on a balance of
probabilities, the respondents had continued to create the
impression that they operated as attorneys (paras [21]–[23]), but
that the court order preventing them from providing legal services
was ‘so general and so wide’ that it infringed on their freedom to
trade, and that any such order ought more clearly to specify the
legal services which were not to be performed in the future (para
[25]). However, it was clear that these particular respondents had
continued at least to hold themselves out as attorneys, having
been struck off, and were thus in contempt of the court order
which removed them from the roll (para [36]). This conclusion
was reached despite Lekale AJ finding, in a colourful metaphor,
that it was ‘reasonably possibly true’ that Macheka, in anticipation
of his likely striking-off, had thrown ‘the proverbial javelin by
divesting himself of the relevant files in favour of the close
corporation before the lightning could strike’ (ibid).
Finally, in regard to the maintenance of professional regulation,
several issues relating to entry into the attorneys’ profession, and
in particular the calculation of the period in which articles of
clerkship are served, came before the Supreme Court of Appeal
in Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Mahon 2011 (2) SA 441
(SCA). In this case the respondent had entered into a contract
relating to her service as a candidate attorney with a leading firm
of trademark attorneys, but this service was subject unusually to
a probationary period of three months. Mahon duly served such
probation, and then a further period of about 21 months as a
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candidate attorney, after which she left to work as a legal adviser
for a financial institution. She then applied to the Gauteng North
High Court for enrolment as an attorney, arguing for the condona-
tion of the period served on probation before she entered into the
formal contract of articles of clerkship, as being the type of
‘irregular service’ contemplated in section 13(2) of the Attorneys
Act. This order was duly granted (see Ex parte Mahon 2010 (2)
SA 511 (GNP)), but the Law Society was unhappy with this ruling,
and so appealed. In a carefully reasoned and detailed judgment,
Cachalia JA (Lewis JA, Leach JA, Tshiqi JA and Ebrahim AJA
concurring) explored the proper meaning to be given to the
concept ‘irregular service’ in the Act, and concluded that the pro-
bationary period served by Mahon did not qualify as such. In
doing so, the court endorsed the crucial role played by the Law
Society as the gatekeeper of entry into the profession, as follows
(para [12]):
‘What emerges . . . is that the legislature intended the terms of the
clerkship agreement to be the bedrock of the regulatory regime
governing candidate attorneys. But it recognized that the strict
application of this regime may sometimes cause hardship. . . . What
the legislature had in mind by ‘‘irregular service’’ were ‘‘breaks in
service either through accident . . . or through a bona fide mistake, or
through other sufficient cause’’.’
But the recognition of such service by the high court was
conditional on the conclusion of a valid contract of articles of
clerkship, which had not been the case here.
The court then had to deal with the possible influence on the
Law Society’s regulatory regime flowing from the entrenchment in
the Bill of Rights (s 22) of the freedom of profession, as in
Macheka. In a learned and nuanced analysis, Cachalia JA
weighed up the effect of this right as well as the general
constitutional values of fairness and justice on the court’s inter-
pretation of section 13 of the Act (paras [20]–[32]), but held that
they did not assist Mahon. As to remedy, the court adopted an
agreement reached by both parties, which allowed Mahon to
complete the final three months of her service as a candidate
attorney, or to do community service in its place, and then to
approach the high court with an application for enrolment as an
attorney.
These cases show the courts maintaining the hegemony of the
professional governing bodies over the disposition of legal
services to the public, founded in a concern for compliance with
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professional ethical standards, yet being willing to situate the
discharge of those responsibilities within the broader constitu-
tional context. It may well be argued that the practising profes-
sional governing bodies have been more assiduous in pursuit of
their disciplinary function than has the JSC in regard to alleged
judicial misconduct, as detailed above.
POLICE
In Minister of Safety and Security and Others v Craig and
Others NNO 2011 (1) SACR 469 (SCA), the court confirmed an
approach adopted in Mtati v Minister of Justice 1958 (1) SA 221
(A), that police have a duty to ensure the wellbeing of prisoners in
their charge. Thus, police have an obligation to obtain the
necessary medical assistance for a prisoner when it appears that
he or she is in distress, injured or ill.
In this case, a driver of a motor car, who was heavily under the
influence of alcohol, caused an accident with disastrous conse-
quences. An oncoming vehicle was hit which caught alight. Two
children who were passengers in this vehicle were burnt to death.
The intoxicated driver survived the collision and was arrested at
the scene by two police officers. The driver was taken to the
rooms of a district surgeon for the purposes of the administration
of a blood-alcohol test. He was then transferred to the nearby
police station where members of his family requested that he be
released on bail. This was refused. The family then urged the
police to allow them to take him to hospital but this plea, too, was
refused.
The police officer on duty summonsed paramedics to examine
him. They duly arrived and announced that there was nothing
wrong with him. It appears that on the next morning the driver
complained that he was feeling unwell. The investigating officer,
acting on his own initiative, transported him to the nearby
hospital, where, despite the hospital staff’s best efforts to resusci-
tate him, he died.
The deceased’s wife and daughter instituted an action against
the appellant. In overturning the judgment of the court a quo,
which had held in favour of the family, Navsa JA found that the
police had fulfilled the relevant obligations in that paramedics
had been summonsed. Later, when the deceased had com-
plained that he was unwell, he was transported expeditiously to
hospital. Accordingly the court concluded that, ‘it could hardly be
said of the police that they were negligent’ (para [69]).
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In Minister of Safety and Security v Venter and Others 2011 (2)
SACR 67 (SCA), the appellant was held liable for the respon-
dent’s damages arising from the negligent failure of members of
the police service to perform their duties in terms of the Domestic
Violence Act 116 of 1998, being to advise and to assist persons in
asserting their rights under this Act.
Briefly, the facts were that the first respondent enjoyed a close
relationship with the second respondent, who was married to a
third party, Van Wyngaardt. It was clear that Van Wyngaardt had
become particularly jealous of this relationship between the
respondents and made incessant telephone calls and sent
abusive text messages to them. He threatened to set their house
on fire as well as to kill them. At some point, the respondents
approached the police for assistance. As the first respondent did
not wish the police to conduct an investigation, the police officer
on duty informed him that the police could not assist and nothing
came of his complaint. Thereafter, the first respondent again
approached the police and, with some reluctance, the police
officer took down ‘a brief, unattested statement’ from the second
respondent.
The respondents’ fears proved justified. Some time after the
second approach had been made to the police, Van Wyngaardt
entered the first respondent’s house, raped the second respon-
dent, and attempted to kill the first respondent with his firearm.
After he had been arrested, he committed suicide in the police
cells. The respondents sued the appellant for damages based on
the failure of the police to perform the legal duty to assist the
respondents to take steps to protect themselves under the
Domestic Violence Act.
In his judgment, Majiedt JA set out a wide range of duties which
are imposed upon both the station commander and the police
officer on duty who receives a complaint under the Domestic
Violence Act. There is a duty to render general assistance to the
complainant as well as specific assistance, including an obliga-
tion to open a docket, to register it for investigation and, when
no complaint is made, to assist a complainant to formulate a
complaint. The complainant must be provided with a notice which
details a complainant’s right to lay a charge or to apply for a
protection order or to do both. The complainant must be informed
that it is not necessary to lay a charge before applying for a
protection order. The respondents’ case was that, had they been
made aware of these rights, they would have taken the appropri-
ate steps to protect themselves and to procure a protection order.
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The court emphasized the important obligations which were
placed upon the police in terms of the Act:
‘The legislature clearly identified the need for a bold new strategy to
meet the rampant threat of ever increasing incidents of domestic
violence. Its efforts would come to nought if the police, as first point of
contact in giving effect to these rights and remedies, remain distant
and aloof to them, as the facts of this case appeared to suggest’ (para
[27]).
In contrast to the court a quo, Majiedt JA found that the
respondents were also negligent in failing to obtain the necessary
interdict. This failure had contributed to the harm which had
ensued. The court emphasized that the first respondent was an
ex-policeman and was knowledgeable about this type of remedy
although only in broad detail. Accordingly, the court determined
that the respondents’ degree of culpability be put at 25 per cent
and that the necessary apportionment in respect of the damages
had to be made.
Crime statistics
The most recent statistics were published in the SAPS Crime
Report 2010/2011 for the period 1 April 2010 to 31 March 2011.
The following table sets out the comparison for serious crimes
as from the 2003/2004 year to the 2010/2011 year.
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Perhaps the most reliable figure in this set of statistics is the
number of murders reported, given the fact that when a murder is
reported a dead body has been found. Hence, it is less likely that
these figures could be manipulated to reveal an improvement.
The number of murders in South Africa declined by 6.5 per cent in
2010/2011 with 15 940 cases having been recorded. An exami-
nation of a pattern which can be gleaned from the reported
figures 2003/2004 shows that the murder rate has declined by
almost twenty per cent during this period. Attempted murders
have also declined, in this case by 12.4 per cent, and assault with
the attempt to inflict grievous bodily harm has decreased by 4.5
per cent.
Although the figures of sexual offences revealed a decline of
three per cent, the number of reported rapes, which is a
notoriously unreliable figure, still rose from 55 097 to 56 272
during the reported year.
94 police officers were killed in the line of duty, which consti-
tutes a slight decline from the previous year of 110 fatalities.
Statistics South Africa released key findings from a victim of
crimes survey which was conducted from January to March 2011
(Statistics South Africa: Statistical Release: PO 341: November
2011). From a sample size of 29 754 dwelling units drawn across
all nine provinces, the authors of the report found that more than
40 per cent of these households believed the level of both violent
and non-violent crimes had decreased in their area of residence
during the period 2008/2010. Less than 35 per cent noted that
crime had increased and the balance of the sample believed
that crime had stayed the same. 53 per cent of households,
which reported, perceived housebreakings/burglaries to be one
of the most common types of crime, followed by home robbery
(49.7 per cent), street robbery (40.9 per cent) and pickpocketing
(28.5 per cent). A third of households avoided going to open
spaces unaccompanied because of the fear of crime, followed by
22.2 per cent of households who would not allow their children to
move around, unsupervised by an older person, or play freely in
the area, while 14.7 per cent of households do not permit their
children to walk to school alone.
The gender imbalance with regard to fear of crime was also
reflected in the study. Male headed households were much more
likely (54.1 per cent) to feel safe and walk alone during the day as
opposed to female headed households (34.1 per cent). 22.7 per
cent of male headed households feel safer when walking alone
after dark, compared to 14.3 per cent of the female population.
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Significantly, more than 60 per cent of households consider
that property and violent crimes were likely to be committed by
people from their own area, while 32 per cent believe that crimes
were committed by people from other areas. Approximately
seven per cent considered that the perpetrators of crime in the
neighbourhood were people who came from outside of South
Africa. A large portion of households consider that criminals were
more likely to be motivated by real need (57.6 per cent) rather
than by greed (45.9 per cent) and non-financial motives 28.7 per
cent. Approximately twenty per cent reported that criminals were
motivated by behavioural issues such as drug usage.
Some 21.9 per cent of victims of assault were attacked by
those who were members of the relevant community in their area,
including their spouse or partner (20.9 per cent). Only 10.5 per
cent reported that perpetrators were unknown to community
members. With regard to sexual assaults, 38.4 per cent of victims
were victimized by a known community member. The study
indicated that 33.6 per cent of sexual offices, including sexual
assault, rape and domestic abuse occurred in a field or a nearby
park followed by 29.8 per cent who reported that these offences
took place at home and 18.5 per cent who reported that the crime
took place at someone else’s home.
PRISONS
Legislation
The Correctional Matters Amendment Act 5 of 2011 has
amended certain key provisions of the Correctional Services Act
of 1998. The significant amendments to the 1998 Act include the
express objective of managing remand detainees, amendments
regarding the calculation of the length and form of sentences so
that a shorter non-parole period for offenders serving sentences
of less than 24 months can be imposed, together with the repeal
of the 4⁄5 non-parole period in respect of mandatory minimum
sentences. An amendment regulates medical parole in far
greater detail and includes offenders who have ‘become physi-
cally incapacitated’.
The majority of these provisions came into effect on 1 March
2012, in particular the new medical parole policy and amend-
ments to section 73 of the Act which provide for minimum
detention periods. A medical parole advisory board has also now
been appointed in order to give effect to the changes brought
about by the amending Act.
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Offenders who are sentenced for a period of up to 24 months
now qualify for consideration for parole after having served a
quarter of their term as opposed to a third. Offenders sentenced
to a prescribed minimum sentence now qualify for consideration
for parole after serving half of their sentences as opposed to a
fifth of the sentence.
Provision is now made for remand prisoners to be allowed to be
supplied with food and drink which can be brought to them by
family while in a remand detention facility. They must wear a
prescribed uniform which distinguishes them from sentenced
prisoners. Every remand detainee, who, upon admission, claims
to be pregnant, must immediately be referred to a registered
medical practitioner for a full medical examination in order to
confirm the pregnancy and thereafter every pregnant remanded
detainee must be provided with an adequate diet to promote
good health.
Of particular significance is a new provision (s 49G), which
provides that the period of incarceration for a remand detainee
must not exceed two years from the initial date of admission into
the remand detention facility, without the matter being brought to
the attention of the court concerned. Once a remand detainee is
held for a period exceeding two years, he/she must be referred to
the relevant court by the head of the remand detention facility or
correctional centre to determine whether the person should be
detained further or be released under conditions which the court
considers appropriate.
In the case of a sentenced offender serving a determinate
sentence or cumulative sentences of more than 24 months, the
offender may not be placed on parole until he/she has served
either the stipulated non-parole period or, if there is not such a
stipulated period, then half of the sentence. Parole must be
considered when the prisoner has served 25 years of the
sentence or accumulated sentence.
Case law
In Lee v Minister of Correctional Services 2011 (2) SACR 603
(WCC), the plaintiff claimed damages from the defendant for
harm which had been suffered as a result of his having con-
tracted Pulmonary Tuberculosis (‘TB’) while incarcerated as an
awaiting trial prisoner in Pollsmoor Prison for some four and a half
years between 1999 and 2004. The plaintiff had testified that he
had been tested for TB once or twice when he was a child but that
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he had never encountered any problem with the disease. He was
always a fit and active person apart from some trouble with his
heart and prostate. However, he had never been ill with TB prior
to his incarceration. He testified that in 2003 he experienced
heavy coughing fits which continued for weeks. He started losing
weight and had experienced night sweats. He became con-
cerned and asked for a sputum test to be conducted. The test
results were negative. When the cough continued, he was given
another test which also produced negative results. Only after he
was admitted to hospital, was a further test conducted which
revealed that he did suffer from TB.
Based on the evidence, De Swardt AJ found that a consider-
able number of prisoners who were ill with TB and were thus
infectious were not isolated from the general prison population. It
was reasonable to conclude that persons who were so infected
would expel bacteria by coughing, sneezing or spitting. The
transmitted bacteria would infect fellow inmates who were in
close proximity. In the view of the court, the plaintiff had been
infected with TB bacteria during his imprisonment and had
consequently become ill. The prison authorities could have
prevented or curtailed the spread of TB in a maximum security
prison like Pollsmoor by providing for a sufficient number of
adequately trained nursing staff, to properly screen all incoming
prisoners for TB, to screen inmates regularly for TB, and to
counsel those inmates who had contact with freshly diagnosed
patients.
Based on the evidence the court concluded that the plaintiff
had been detained in extremely overcrowded and poorly venti-
lated cells. Despite the fact that he received adequate medical
treatment once he had been diagnosed with TB, the severe
shortage of qualified nurses, who could have conducted the
necessary tests and cared for the prisoners, had
‘. . . caused health services in prisons to break down. As a conse-
quence, persons who were ill with TB were not routinely provided with
adequate treatment. . .’ (para [264]).
De Swardt AJ concluded that prison inmates live in a closed
environment, which puts them at the mercy of the officials who
run the prisons. The court held that —
‘. . . it was the duty of the defendant and his officials in terms of the
1958 Act (the Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959) and the Constitution
to provide prisoners with treatment which is neither inhumane nor
degrading and to preserve prisoners’ rights to dignity. The failure of
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defendant and his official to do so is, in my view, not justifiable whether
in terms of s 36 of the Constitution or otherwise’ (para [268]).
For these reasons, the court held that the failure of the prison
officials to take the necessary steps to guard against the spread
of TB in the maximum security prison was unlawful and the
defendant was declared to be liable in delict, pursuant to
the plaintiff having become ill with TB while still incarcerated.
The Supreme Court of Appeal has since set aside the High
Court judgment (Minister of Correctional Services v Lee [2012]
ZASCA 23 (to be discussed in the 2012 Annual Survey)).
Prison statistics
The figures relating to the state of prisoners in South Africa is
derived from the Annual report of 2010/2011 of the Judicial
Inspectorate for Correctional Services. As at 31 March 2011,
there were 241 operational correctional centres in South Africa,
129 of which were used for male inmates, eight for females, and
91 for both male and female prisoners. These prisons have the
joint capacity to house 118 154 prisoners but, as at 31 March
2011, they contained a total of 160 545 prisoners, an overcrowd-
ing level therefore of 135.87 per cent, which is a reduction on the
level of 139 per cent for the comparable date in 2010. By
31 August 2011, the Inspector Judge reported a further improve-
ment in the total number of prisoners which had reduced to
157 375.
The highest level of overcrowding took place in Gauteng
(172.65 per cent) followed by the Eastern Cape (146.35 per cent)
and the Western Cape (142.95 per cent). The total number of
sentenced prisoners is 112 683. 66 per cent of these prisoners
are older than 25, 25 per cent are aged between 21 and 25;
juvenile prisoners between ages of eighteen and 21 constitute
eight per cent of the prison population while only one per cent
consists of children below the age of 18.
The prison population can be further divided into categories of
crime which have been committed, including aggressive crimes
(52 per cent), economic crimes (25 per cent), sexual offences
(15 per cent), narcotic offences (3 per cent) and other forms of
crime (5 per cent).
The Inspector Judge reported that, as at 31 March 2011,
notwithstanding the reduction in the average rate of overcrowd-
ing, eighteen prisons were critically overcrowded by more than
200 per cent.
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The effect of minimum sentence legislation is again empha-
sized in the report concerning the nature of the prison population.
52 050 prisoners are serving sentences ranging from twenty
years to life. Accordingly, the report suggests that the Depart-
ment of Correctional Services has committed itself to reviewing
the minimum sentence legislation that has contributed to these
increases and the further effects that long sentences have on
overcrowding, costs or prisons and prison gangs. There was a
small reduction in the number of long term prisoners from 53 944
in 2010 to 52 050 in 2011.
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